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Introduction
In the discussion of the current nancial crisis much is made of the apparent causal
eects from a decline in the liquidity of nancial assets to the crisis of the economy. In
this paper we show that such eects are not new, changes in the liquidity of the US stock
market has been coinciding with changes in the real economy at least since the Second
World War. Stock market liquidity is in fact a very good \leading indicator" of the real
economy. Using data for the US over the period 1947 to 2008, we document that measures
of stock market liquidity contains leading information about the real economy, also after
controlling for other asset price predictors. Figure 1 serves to illustrate the relationship
found between stock market liquidity and the business cycles. Liquidity is measured by
the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio (ILR) and NBER recession periods are marked with
grey bars. Observe how liquidity is worsening (illiquidity increasing) well ahead of the
onset of a recession.
We speculate that the observed eects are the results of aggregate portfolio shifts
from individual investors, where changes in desired portfolios are driven by changes in
individuals' expectations of the real economy. We nd some empirical evidence consistent
with this hypothesis. First, using data for the US, we show that the informativeness of
stock market liquidity for the real economy diers across stocks. In particular, the most
informative stocks are those of small rms, which are the least liquid. Second, using
1data for Norway, where we have unusually detailed information about the composition
of ownership of the whole stock market, we show that changes in liquidity coincide with
changes in portfolio compositions of investors of the hypothesized type. Before economic
recessions we observe a \
ight to liquidity", where some investors leave the stock market
altogether, and others shift their stock portfolios into more liquid stocks.
Our results are related to several strands of the literature. One important strand
is the literature on forecasting economic growth using dierent asset prices, including
interest rates, term spreads, stock returns and exchange rates. The forward-looking
nature of asset markets makes the use of these prices as predictors of the real economy
intuitive. If a stock price equals the expected discounted value of future earnings, it seems
natural that it should contain information about future earnings growth. Theoretically,
a link between asset prices and the real economy can be established from a consumption
smoothing argument. If investors are willing to pay more for an asset that pays o
when the economy is thought to be in a bad state than an asset that pays o when
the economy is thought to be in a good state, then current asset prices should contain
information about investors' expectations about the future real economy. In their survey
article, Stock and Watson (2003) conclude, however, that there is considerable instability
in the predictive power of asset prices, that the predictive content of asset prices has a
strong situational dependence.
We shift focus to a dierent aspect of asset markets, the liquidity of the stock market,
i.e. the costs of trading equities. It is a common observation that stock market liquidity
tends to dry up during economic downturns, however, we show that the relationship
between trading costs and the real economy is much more pervasive than previously
thought. A link from trading costs to the real economy is not as intuitive as the link
from asset prices. The most likely explanation is that time varying aggregate liquidity in
some way re
ects transactions investors do today to hedge their perceived consumption
risk tomorrow. In a standard Merton (1973) consumption-portfolio decision problem,
these trades would constitute hedging demand related to state variables that forecast
changes in the investment opportunity set. The trades could also re
ect time variation in
investor's risk aversion. There is no direct link, however, from asset pricing models to the
behavior of liquidity. Intuitively, if investors hold stocks as hedges of consumption risk,
and these hedging properties varies across stocks, the desired portfolio compositions of
individual investors will change with people's expectations of the economy. A well known
example of such portfolio changes is the idea of a \
ight to liquidity," people moving out
of less liquid investments in economic downturns, see for instance Longsta (2004). As
long as expectations about the economy are not biased on average, changes in liquidity
stemming from portfolio shifts in one direction should have predictive content.
2If investors move away from equity in general, and small/illiquid stocks in particular,
when they expect an economic downturn, we should observe a relationship between time
variation in liquidity and market participation, i.e. liquidity should worsen when the
number of participants in the market falls and vice versa. The links found between
liquidity and market participation using a special data set on investor ownership from
the Norwegian stock market supports such a hypothesis.
Two recent papers on the relationship between equity order 
ow and macro funda-
mentals are closely related to our work. Beber, Brandt, and Kavajecz (2008) examine
the information in order 
ow movements across equity sectors over the period 1993-2005
and nd that an order 
ow portfolio based on cross-sector movements predicts the state
of the economy up to three months ahead. They also nd that the cross section of order

ow across sectors contains information about future returns in the stock and bond mar-
kets. Kaul and Kayacetin (2009) study two measures of aggregate stock market order

ow over the period 1988-2004 and nd that they both predict future growth rates for
industrial production and real GDP. The common theme of these two papers and our
research is that the trading process in stock markets contains leading information about
the economy. Our results are by far the most robust ones as they are based on a sample
period that spans over 60 years and cover 10 recessions. The two order 
ow papers also
nds some evidence that order 
ow contains information about future asset price changes.
Kaul and Kayacetin (2009) and Evans and Lyons (2008) argue that the extra information
contained in order 
ow data can be explained by aggregate order 
ows bringing together
dispersed information from heterogeneously informed investors. Another explanation for
why liquidity seems to be a better predictor than stock price changes is that stock prices
contain a more complex mix of information that makes the signals from stock returns
more blurred (Harvey, 1988).
Fujimoto (2003) and S oderberg (2008) examine the relationship between liquidity
and macro fundamentals. However, they both investigate whether time varying stock
market liquidity has macroeconomic sources. They do not consider the possibility that
the causality goes the other way. Gibson and Mougeot (2004) nd some evidence that
a time varying liquidity risk premium in the US stock market is related to a recession
index over the 1973-1997 period.
Our paper also contributes to the market microstructure literature on liquidity. Com-
monality in liquidity is well documented in this literature, however, it is not fully under-
stood why this phenomenon is observed. Attempts to explain commonality have been
either linked to the standard microstructure concepts of private information and inventory
costs (Huberman and Halka, 2001; Fujimoto, 2003) or based on specic assumptions about
liquidity providers (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009) or investors (Vayanos, 2004). The
3problem with market microstructure models in this setting is that they typically treat
liquidity as a xed property of individual assets. It is therefore not obvious that these
models can explain time variation in aggregate liquidity. In the Brunnermeier and Ped-
ersen (2009) model, commonality in liquidity is explained by liquidity providers who face
funding constraints. A problem with the model is that it cannot easily explain time
varying liquidity in electronic limit order markets without designated dealers (as e.g. the
Norwegian stock exchange). Even though one cannot rule out that limit order traders are
also funding constrained in some ways during economic downturns, it is hard to believe
that these constraints should aect all stocks in the way prescribed in the model. In
the Vayanos (2004) model, investors are assumed to be fund managers, i.e. they receive
fees depending on the wealth under management and face a risk of investor withdrawals.
Again this is not a credible description of the trading process in real stock markets.
Our nding that time varying liquidity has a business cycle component is new and
quite intriguing. It suggests that pricing of liquidity risk cannot be explained solely
by uninformed investors who require a premium for ending up with the stock that the
informed investors sell, as suggested in O'Hara (2003). Hence, the traditional arguments
for why market microstructure matter for asset returns might be too narrow.
By showing that microstructure liquidity measures are relevant for macroeconomic
analysis our paper also enhances our understanding of the mechanism by which asset
markets are linked to the macro economy. We show that the predictive power of liquidity
holds up to adding existing asset price predictors. Given the documented instability in
the predictive power of asset prices, an incremental indicator that might react earlier or
in some way dierently to shocks in the economy might prove useful.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We rst, in section 1, discuss possible
empirical measures of asset liquidity. We dene the measures we use, discuss the data
sources, and give some summary statistics. Next, in section 2 we document that liquidity
is related to the real economy using data for the US in the period 1947-2008. In section 3
we look closer at the causes of this predictability by splitting stocks by size, and showing
that the main source of the predictability is small, relatively illiquid stocks. In section 4 we
use Norwegian data to do two things. First we conrm the US results, that stock market
liquidity contains information about the macroeconomy. We go on to show some evidence
of the causes of time variation in aggregate liquidity, by linking changes in liquidity to
changes in the portfolio composition of all investors at the Oslo Stock Exchange. We
construct several measures of changes in the portfolio composition of investors, and show
that periods when liquidity worsen are the same as periods when there is a \
ight to
liquidity" in the stock portfolios of owners. Finally, section 5 oers some concluding
remarks.
41 Liquidity measures and data
1.1 Liquidity measures
Given that there are numerous theoretical denitions of liquidity, it should come as no
surprise that there are many dierent empirical measures used to capture liquidity. Since
our focus is on the link between liquidity and the real economy, we are agnostic about
this. We use a number of common measures and show that the relevant links are relatively
independent of which liquidity measures we employ. Our choices of liquidity measures
are driven by our desire for reasonably long time series. Many liquidity measures re-
quire intra-day information on trades and orders to be calculated, which is not available
for the long time period considered in this paper. We therefore employ measures that
can be calculated using data available at a daily frequency. We consider the following
four liquidity measures: Relative spread, the Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999) mea-
sure (LOT), the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio (ILR) and the Roll (1984) implicit spread
estimator. These liquidity proxies are found in Goyenko and Ukhov (2009) and Goyenko,
Holden, and Trzcinka (2009) to do well in capturing the spread cost (Spread, LOT and
Roll measures) and price impact (ILR). Note that all the liquidity measures we employ in
this study are measuring illiquidity. Thus, when the measures have a high value, market
liquidity is low.
Spread costs are observed in dealer markets as well as in limit order markets. The
relative spread (RS) is the quoted spread as a fraction of the midpoint price, and measures
the implicit cost of trading a small number of shares as a fraction of the price.
Lesmond et al. (1999) suggest a measure of transaction costs (hereafter the LOT
measure) that does not depend on information about quotes or the order book. Instead,
the LOT measure is calculated from daily returns. It uses the frequency of zero returns
to estimate an implicit trading cost. The LOT cost is an estimate of the implicit cost
required for a stock's price not to move when the market as a whole moves. To get the
intuition of this measure, consider a simple market model,
Rit = ai + biRmt + "it (1)
where Rit is the return on security i at time t, Rmt is the market return at time t, b is
a regression coecients, a is a constant term, and " is an error term. In this model, for
any change in the market return, the return of security i should move according to (1).
If it does not, it could be that the price movement that should have happened is not
large enough to cover the costs of trading. Lesmond et al. (1999) estimate how wide the
transaction cost band around the current stock price has to be to explain the occurrence
5of no price movements (zero returns). The wider this band, the less liquid the security.
Lesmond et al. shows that their LOT measure is closely related to the bid/ask spread.
We also employ as a liquidity measure the Roll (1984) estimate of the implicit spread.
This spread estimator, also called the eective bid/ask spread, is measured from the serial
covariance of successive price movements. Roll shows that assuming the existence of a
constant eective spread s, this can be estimated as b s =
p
-Scov where Scov is the
rst-order serial covariance of successive returns.1 We calculate the Roll estimator based
on daily returns.
Our nal liquidity measure, Amihud (2002)'s ILR measure, is a measure of the elas-
ticity dimension of liquidity. Elasticity measures of liquidity try to estimate how much
prices move as a response to trading volume. Thus, cost measures and elasticity measures
are strongly related. Kyle (1985) denes price impact as the response of price to order

ow. Amihud proposes a price impact measure that is closely related to Kyle's measure.







where DT is the number of trading days within a time window T, jRi;tj is the absolute
return on day t for security i, and VOLi;t is the trading volume (in units of currency) on
day t. It is standard to multiply the estimate by 106 for practical purposes. The Amihud
measure is called an illiquidity measure since a high estimate indicates low liquidity (high
price impact of trades). Thus, ILR captures how much the price moves for each volume
unit of trades.
1.2 Liquidity data
To calculate the liquidity measures we use data on stock prices, returns, and trading
volume. For the US, the data source is CRSP, and the sample we are looking at covers
the period 1947 through 2008. To keep the sample as homogeneous as possible through
the entire period, we restrict the analysis to stocks listed at the New York Stock Ex-
change (NYSE).2 For Norway we have similar data to the CRSP data. These data are
1This estimator is only dened when Scov < 0. Harris (1990) suggests dening b s = -2
p
Scov if
Scov > 0, but this would lead to an assumed negative implicit spread. A negative transaction cost for
equity trading is not meaningful. We therefore only use the Roll estimator for stocks with Scov < 0, and
leave the others undened.
2We only look at ordinary common shares, and remove securities with exchange codes -2 (trade halt),
-1 (suspended), 0 (not listed), 4 (NYSE Arca) and 31-34 (when issued trading at the NYSE, AMEX,
NASDAQ and NYSE Arca respectively).
6obtained from the Oslo Stock Exchange data service.3 The Norwegian sample covers the
period 1980-2008. For both the US and Norwegian sample, we calculate the dierent liq-
uidity measures each quarter for each security, and then take averages across securities.
In table 1 below we give a number of descriptive statistics for these series of liquidity
measures. Note that for the US, we do not have complete data for bid/ask spreads, and
will therefore have to leave these out in our time series analysis of the US.4
Looking rst at the descriptive statistics for the US in panel A of table 1 we see that
the average relative spread for the full sample period was 2.1% of the price, while the
relative spread of the median rm was 1.4%. Looking at the subperiod statistics we see
that there has been some changes over time across all liquidity measures. Panel B shows
the correlations between the liquidity proxies for the US. We see that all the liquidity
measures are positively correlated. The lowest correlation is between ILR and Roll, but
the correlation is still as high as 0.32.
Panel C of table 1 gives descriptive statistics for the Norwegian sample covering the
period 1980-2008. The liquidity of the Norwegian market has improved over the sample,
but has also varied across sub periods. From Panel D we see that all the liquidity proxies
are strongly positively correlated also for Norway. Overall, the high correlations between
these measures suggest they contain some of the same information.
1.3 Macro data
To proxy for the state of the real economy we use real GDP (GDPR), unemployment rate
(UE), real consumption (CONSR) and real investment (INV).5 We also use a number of
nancial variables which are shown in the literature to contain leading information about
economic growth. From the equity market we use Excess market return (Rm), calculated
as the value weighted return on the S&P500 index in excess of the 3 month T-bill rate,
and Market volatility (Vola), measured as the cross sectional average volatility of the
sample stocks. We also use the term spread (Term), calculated as the dierence between
the yield on a 10-year Treasury bond benchmark and the yield on the 3 month t-bill,
and the credit spread (Cred) measured as the yield dierence between the Moody's Baa
3We use all equities listed at the OSE with the exception of very illiquid stocks. Our criteria for
ltering the data are the same as those used in Ns, Skjeltorp, and degaard (2008), i.e. that we remove
years where a stock is priced below NOK 10, and remove stocks with less than 20 trading days in a year.
4This is due to these not being present in the CRSP data for the whole period. They have been
backlled for the early period, but in the fties through the seventies there is essentially no spread data
in the CRSP series.
5The GDP series is the Real Gross Domestic Product, UE is the Unemployment rate for fulltime
workers, CONSR is real Personal Consumption Expenditures, and INV is real Private Fixed Investments.
All series are seasonally adjusted. GDP and INV are from the Federal Reserve Bank of St Luis, UE is
from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, and CONSR from the US Dept of Commerce.
7credit benchmark and the yield on a 30 year government bond benchmark. The Moody's
long term corporate bond yield benchmark consists of seasoned corporate bonds with
maturities as close as possible to 30 years.6 We use similar macro series for Norway.7 In
the analysis we dierentiate the macro variables.8
Table 2 shows the contemporaneous correlations between the dierent variables used
in the analysis for the US. All three liquidity measures are negatively correlated with
the term structure and positively correlated with the credit spread. Thus, when market
liquidity worsens, the term spread decreases and the credit spread increases. There is
a positive correlation between all liquidity measures and market volatility, and a neg-
ative correlation between liquidity and the excess return on the market (Rm). Thus,
when market liquidity is low, market volatility is high and realized market returns are
low. All liquidity variables are negatively correlated with growth in GDP, investments
and consumption, and positively correlated with unemployment. Note that the macro
variables are not known to the market participants before the following quarter, thus,
these correlations is a rst indication that there is real time information about current
underlying economic growth in market liquidity variables. Furthermore, we also see that
the term spread has a signicant positive correlation with GDP growth and consumption
growth, while the credit spread is negatively correlated with GDP growth, investment
growth, consumption growth and positively correlated with unemployment. The signs of
these correlations are what we would expect. Stock market volatility and return are not
signicantly correlated with any of the macro variables, except for consumption growth.
Finally, as one would expect, all the macro variables are signicantly correlated with each
other, and have the expected signs.
1.4 Norwegian ownership data
An important reason for including Norwegian data in the paper is the availability of data
on stock market ownership for all investors at the Oslo Stock Exchange, which we use to
investigate aggregate patterns in stock ownership.
Our data on stock ownership is from the centralized records on stock ownership in
Norway. All ownership of stocks at the Oslo Stock Exchange is registered in a single,
government-controlled entity, the Norwegian Central Securities Registry (VPS). From
6The source of these variables is Ecowin/Reuters.
7GDP is the real Gross Domestic Product for Mainland Norway (excluding oil production). UE is the
Unemployment Rate (AKU), CONSR is the real Households Consumption Expenditure and INV is real
Gross Investments. All numbers are seasonally adjusted. The data source is Statistics Norway (SSB).
8dGDPR is the real GDP growth, calculated as dGPDR = ln(GDPt=GDPt-1). dUE is the change in
unemployment rate , calculated as dUE = UEt-UEt-1, dCONSR is the real consumption growth, calcu-
lated as dCONSR = ln(CONSRt=CONSRt-1) and dINV is the real growth in investments , calculated
as dINV = ln(INVt=INVt-1).
8this source we have access to monthly observations of the equity holdings of the complete
stock market. At each date we observe the number of stocks held by every owner. Each
owner has a unique identier which allow us to follow the owners' holdings over time.
For each owner the data also includes a sector code that allows us to distinguish between
such types as mutual fund owners, nancial owners (which include mutual funds), in-
dustrial (nonnancial corporate) owners, private (individual) owners, state owners and
foreign owners. This data allows us to at each data construct the actual portfolios of all
investors at the stock exchange, as well as for each stock, construct measures of ownership
dispersion and the like.9 Table 3 shows some descriptive statistics for stock ownership at
the Oslo Stock Exchange.
2 Predicting US economic growth with market illiq-
uidity
2.1 In-sample evidence
We start by assessing the in-sample predictive ability of market illiquidity. The models
we examine are predictive regressions on the form:
yt+1 =  + LIQt + 

0Xt + ut+1; (3)
where yt+1 is the growth in the macro variable over quarter t + 1, LIQt is the market
illiquidity measured for quarter t, and Xt is a set of control variables observed at t.
We use three dierent proxies for equity market illiquidity; ILR, LOT and Roll. Since
both the ILR and LOT measure have a downward trend during the sample period, we use
the log dierence of these variables in our analysis. The Roll measure is not dierenced
since it passes stationarity tests. Our main dependent variables (yt+1) is real GDP growth.
However, we also examine additional macro variables related to economic growth.
Table 4 summarizes the results from the various regression specications. The rst
specication only include the liquidity variable and one lag of the dependent variable.10
We see that the coecient on market illiquidity (^ ) is highly signicant for most models
regardless of which illiquidity proxy we use. An increase in market illiquidity predicts a
lower real GDP growth, an increase in unemployment and a slowdown in consumption
9More details about this data can be found in e.g. Bhren and degaard (2001),Bhren and degaard
(2006) and degaard (2008).
10We have also estimated the models with dierent lag specications with up to four lags of the
dependent variable and the liquidity variables. This does not materially aect the results.
9and investments.11 In sum the results indicate that market illiquidity contains signi-
cant information about future economic growth. When market liquidity worsens, this is
followed by a slowdown in economic growth.
Several other nancial variables have been found to contain information about future
macroeconomic conditions. We therefore also consider regression specications where
we control for these variables. Table 2 showed that our liquidity proxies are correlated
with the term spread, the credit spread as well as the market return and volatility. This
is what we would expect, since our hypothesis is that variations in market liquidity
capture the same expectations about future growth as the other nancial variables. The
main purpose of adding other nancial control variables to the models is to determine
whether changes in liquidity provides an additional (or less noisy) signal about future
macro fundamentals. We start by including two non-equity control variables (in addition
to the lag of the dependent variable). The control variables we include are the term
spread (Term) and credit spread (Cred). These regression specications are also listed
in table 4. Looking rst at the estimation results for GDP growth, we see that while
Cred enters signicantly in all three models, the coecients on liquidity retains its level,
sign and signicance. Interestingly, the coecient on the term spread (^ 
Term) is not
signicant in the models that includes ILR or LOT. In unreported specications we nd
that excluding ILR and LOT in these models restores the signicance of Term. The
results for the other macro variables yields the same results. The coecients on liquidity
is robust to the inclusion of the term spread and credit spread in the models. However,
the results suggest that both the term spread and credit spread are important predictor
variables, and a model containing all three variables improves the adjusted R-squared
compared to the model just containing liquidity and lagged dependent variables.
As a nal exercise, we include the equity market variables excess market return (Rm)
and volatility (Vola) into the models in addition to the term spread and credit spread.
In the models for GDP growth we nd that while market volatility is insignicant in
all models, market return enters signicantly with a positive coecient. However, this
does not aect the signicance of any of the liquidity coecients. Thus, market liquidity
retains its predictive power for real GDP growth. In the models for the unemployment
rate the results are more mixed. In the model with ILR, we see that adding market return
renders the ILR coecient insignicant. However, in the models with Roll and LOT, the
coecients are unaected. In the models for real consumption growth we see that market
11 In results not reported in the paper, we also estimate these regressions for sub-periods where we
split the sample in the middle and re-estimate the models for the periods 1947-1977 and 1978-2008.
The results from the sub-sample analysis yields very consistent results for the ILR and Roll measures,
both with respect to the signicance, sign and size of the coecients. On the other hand, for the LOT
measure, the results are much weaker for the second sub-sample.
10liquidity (regardless of liquidity measure) is rendered insignicant when the excess return
on the market is included in the model. Finally, in the models for investment growth the
liquidity coecients are unaected by the inclusion of the market return.
Overall, the results show that while other nancial variables clearly are useful for
predicting future economic growth, we nd that there is additional information in market
illiquidity, even after controlling for well known alternative variables. Market liquidity
seems to be a particularly strong and robust predictor of real GDP growth, unemployment
and investment growth. For future real consumption growth, however, there does not
seem to be additional information in liquidity that is not already re
ected in the term
spread and market return.
Causality
We are primarily interested in predicting macroeconomic conditions with liquidity, but
one may also think of causality going in the opposite direction, i.e. that changes in eco-
nomic conditions aect market illiquidity? We know from earlier studies that monetary
policy shocks have an eect on stock and bond market illiquidity (see e.g. S oderberg
(2008) and Goyenko and Ukhov (2009)) while there is no eect of shocks to real eco-
nomic variables on stock market illiquidity. On the other hand, neither of these studies
consider the reverse causality from market liquidity to real economic variables. We there-
fore look directly at this issue by performing Granger causality tests. We return to the
specication with only liquidity and real variables, and perform Granger causality tests
between the dierent illiquidity proxies and real GDP growth. Table 5 report the results
from these tests. The tests are done in a Vector Auto Regression (VAR) framework where
we choose the optimal lag length based on the Schwartz criterion. We perform the tests
for the whole sample and for dierent sub-samples where we split the sample period in
the middle, and also for ve 20 year sub-periods (overlapping by 10 years). The rst
row of table 5 shows the number of quarterly observations in each sample period, and
the second row shows the number of NBER recessions that occurred within each sample
period. In part (a) of the table we run Granger causality tests between ILR and dGDPR.
Looking rst at the column labeled \Whole sample," we see that the null hypothesis that
GDP growth does not Granger cause ILR (dGDPR 9 dILR) can not be rejected, while
the hypothesis that ILR does not Granger cause GDP growth (dILR 9 dGDPR) is re-
jected at the 1% level. For the dierent sub-periods we see that the relation is remarkably
stable. Thus, part (a) of the table show a strong and stable one way Granger causality
from market illiquidity, proxied by ILR, to GDP growth, while there is no evidence of a
reverse causality from GDP growth to ILR. In parts (b) and (c) of the table we perform
the same tests for the LOT and the Roll measures. For the full sample period, we nd
11one way Granger causality from LOT and Roll to GDP growth, while there is no evidence
of a reverse causality. Also for the sub-periods, we nd one-way Granger causality from
the Roll measure to dGDPR, except for the rst 20 year period were we are only able
to reject the null that the Roll measure do not Granger cause real GDP growth at a
10% signicance level. Based on the sub-sample results for the LOT measure we cannot
reject the null that LOT does not Granger cause dGDPR in the second half of the sam-
ple.12 One potential reason for why the LOT measure has become less informative over
the sample period is increased trading activity. Recall that the LOT measure uses zero
return days to identify the implicit transaction cost for a stock. Thus, if the number of
zero return days has decreased at the same time as the trading activity has increased,
the LOT measure may have become a more noisy estimator of actual transaction costs
in the last part of the sample.
Timing of information
The in-sample results on the predictive content of liquidity for macro variables can be
summarized by a form of \event study." We use the onset of a recession as the \event
date," and show the evolution of the various series of interest around this date in a plot.
In panel A of gure 2 we plot changes in liquidity relative to the onset of a recession, as
dened by the NBER. For each NBER recession, we rst calculate the quarterly GDP
growth starting 5 quarters before (t = -5Q) the rst NBER recession quarter (NBER1)
and ending 5 quarters after the end of each NBER recession (t = 5Q). Next, we average
the GDP growth for each quarter across all recessions, and then accumulate the average
GDP growth over the event window. Then we do the same for the ILR measure. Thus, the
gure shows the average pattern in ILR before, during and after US recessions averaged
across all the 10 NBER recessions (shaded area) in our sample from 1947-2008.13 This
style of analysis also lets us give informative comparisons of informational content of
the dierent predictive variables. Panel B of gure 2 shows similar plots, where we also
add the nancial control variables term spread, credit spread, excess market return and
volatility. Looking rst at the term spread (dotted line) in picture (a) we see that there
is a systematic decline in the term spread in all the quarters prior to the rst NBER
recession quarter (NBER1). This is consistent with the notion that the yield curve has
a tendency to 
atten and invert before recessions. We also see that the term spread
12This is consistent with the sub-sample results for the specication with only liquidity and lagged
explanatory variables, discussed in footnote 11, where LOT was rendered insignicant in the second part
of the sample.
13Note that some NBER recessions only lasts for 3 quarters (e.g. 1980Q1-1980Q3), while there are
some recessions that lasts up to 6 quarters (e.g. 1973Q4-1975Q1 and 1981Q3-1982Q4). However, the
most important point of the gure is that all NBER recessions are aligned to start at the same point
(NBER1) in event time.
12increases again already during the rst quarters of the recession, predicting the end of
the recession and increased growth. Thus, before the recession, the signal from both the
term spread and market liquidity (solid line) seems to capture similar information about
GDP growth. For the credit spread in picture (b), both market liquidity and the credit
spread seems to share a very similar path, although the liquidity series is changing earlier
than the credit spread. As we will see later in the out-of-sample analysis, the credit spread
and market liquidity have very similar out-of-sample performance when predicting GDP
growth. In picture (c) we see that the accumulated excess market return is relatively
stable until the quarter just before the NBER recession starts. Thus, it seems to be
responding later than the other variables. Finally, in picture (d), we see that volatility
increases in the quarter just before the NBER recessions starts. However, consistent with
the regression results, the information in market volatility seems small compared to the
other variables.
2.2 Out-of-sample evidence for the US
In the previous section we found that market illiquidity had predictive power for economic
growth for the whole sample period, for subperiods, and when controlling for other nan-
cial variables that are found in the literature to be informative about future economic
growth. However, in-sample predictability does not necessarily mean that the predictor
is a useful predictor out-of-sample. In this section we therefore examine whether market
illiquidity is able to forecast quarterly real GDP growth out of sample.
Methodology and timing of information
When setting up our out-of-sample procedure, we need to be careful about the timing of
the data so it re
ects what would have been available to the forecaster when a forecast
is made. While the illiquidity variables and the other nancial variables are observable
in real-time without revisions, real GDP growth is not. First, there is a publication lag
of one quarter for GDP.14 Secondly, there is an issue of later revisions in most macro
variables. While the publication lag is easily accounted for, the revisions are more tricky.
Basically, the question is whether we want to forecast the rst or nal vintage of GDP
growth. This depends on the question we are asking. If we were using macro variables to
predict nancial variables (e.g. returns), we would want to use the rst vintage (real time
version) of the macro variable since the later vintages (revised gures) would not be known
14The Bureau of Economic Analysis releases the nal GDP gure for quarter t-1 in the last month
of the following quarter (t). However, they also release an \advance" estimate in the rst month of the
following quarter as well as a \preliminary" release in the second month of the following quarter. Thus,
at the end of t, a forecaster have the \nal" number available for t-1 GDP growth.
13to the forecaster (investor) when making his forecast. However, since the question we
are asking is whether nancial variables contain information about expected economic
growth, we want to forecast the last vintage. The argument for this is that since the
revisions are mainly due to measurement errors in the rst/early vintage series, market
participants' expectations about the underlying economic growth should be unrelated to
(\see through") the measurement errors in the rst vintages. Thus, we want to forecast
the most precisely measured version of the macro variable, i.e. the last vintage series.
In our out-of-sample analysis we consider a rolling estimation scheme with a xed
width of 20 quarters (5 years). For all models, our rst out-of-sample forecast is made in
the end of the rst quarter of 1952 for GDP growth for the second quarter of 1952. At the
end of the rst quarter of 1952 we estimate each model using data from the rst quarter
of 1947 through the fourth quarter of 1951 (which is the most recent GDP observation
available to us in the rst quarter of 1952). We then produce a forecast of real GDP
growth for the second quarter of 1952 based on the estimated model coecients and the
most recent observation of the predictor variable. In the case when the predictor variable
is market liquidity or any of the other nancial variables, these are observed for the same
quarter as we construct our forecast for next quarter. Next, we move the window forward
by one quarter, re-estimate the models, and produce a new forecast for the next quarter,
and so on. The last forecast is made at the fourth quarter of 2008 for GDP growth for
the rst quarter of 2009.
We compare the performance of a model with market liquidity as the predictor against
models with other nancial variables. We also compare the illiquidity model against a
benchmark model where we forecast GDP growth using an autoregressive model. In that
case, the most recent observation of GDP available to us at the end of the rst quarter
of 1952 is GDP for the fourth quarter of 1951. Thus, we estimate the autoregressive
model for GDP growth with data including the fourth quarter of 1951, and construct a
forecast for the second quarter of 1952 based on the estimated coecients and the most
recent GDP observation available, which is the nal gure for GDP growth for the fourth
quarter of 1951.
Out-of-sample performance of dierent liquidity measures
We begin by evaluating univariate forecast models for real GDP growth using the three
dierent liquidity proxies. The models are evaluated by comparing the mean squared
forecast error (MSE) from the series of on-quarter ahead forecasts. Since we compare
models for the same dependent variable, but with dierent predictor variables, the models
are non-nested. We use two statistics to compare the out-of-sample performance of the
dierent liquidity measures; the mean-squared forecasting error (MSE) ratio and the
14modied Diebold-Mariano (MDM) encompassing test proposed by Harvey, Leybourne,
and Newbold (1998), which has greater power than the original Diebold and Mariano
(1995) test, especially in small samples. In addition, Harvey et al. (1998) advocate the
comparison of the MDM statistic with critical values from the Student's t distribution,
instead of the standard normal distribution.
The Diebold and Mariano (1995) statistic (hereafter DM) is calculated in the follow-
ing way: Suppose we have a candidate predictor i and a competing predictor k. We
want to test the null hypothesis of equal predictive accuracy that E[ d] = 0 8 t, where
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and the modi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where DM is the original statistic, P is the number of out-of-sample forecasts and h is
the forecast horizon (overlap). The MDM statistic is compared with critical values from
the Student's t distribution with (P - 1) degrees of freedom.
Panel A in Table 6 shows the results when we compare dierent forecasting models for
quarterly GDP growth using dierent proxies for market liquidity. The liquidity variables
labeled in the rst row (under Model 1) constitute the respective candidate variable (i),
and the liquidity variables labeled in the rst column (under Model 2) are the competing
variables (k). For example, the rst pair of numbers compares the MSE from a model
(Model 1) that uses the ILR as predictor variable against a model (Model 2) that uses
LOT as the predictor variable. The rst number shows the relative MSE between the
two models, which is 0.89. This means that the model with ILR as a predictor variable
has a lower MSE than the model that uses LOT. The second number shows the modied
Diebold/Mariano statistic (MDM) which provides a statistic to test for whether the MSE
of model 1 is signicantly dierent from that of Model 2. The last row in the table shows
the MSE for each model specication labeled under Model 1. Looking rst at the last
row, we see that the model with ILR has the lowest MSE across the models. Also, when
comparing the forecast performance of the dierent models against each other we see
that model with ILR in all cases has a signicantly lower MSE compared to models with
LOT and Roll as predictor variables. The model with LOT as the predictor variable has
a lower MSE than the Roll model. The MDM statistic cannot however reject the null
15that the MSE of the LOT model is not signicantly dierent from the MSE of the Roll
model.
Overall, the results in panel A of table 6 show that ILR has the lowest forecast error
for GDP growth among the three liquidity proxies we examine. This is consistent with
the in sample results where ILR was the strongest and most robust predictor of GDP
growth. In the rest of the out-of-sample analysis we therefore use the ILR as our liquidity
predictor variable.
Out-of-sample performance of illiquidity versus other variables
We next want to evaluate the out-of-sample predictive ability of ILR against dierent
baseline models. We assess the out-of-sample performance of ILR against two types
of baseline models. The rst set of baseline models are models where GDP growth is
regressed on one of the nancial control variables (Term, Cred, Vola, Rm) that we used
in the in-sample analysis. Each of these models is then a restricted (nested) version of a
larger model where GDP growth is regressed on the control variable in addition to ILR.
The second type baseline model that we compare ILR to is an autoregressive model for
GDP growth. In that case, the autoregressive GDP model is the restricted version of a
model where we include both lagged GDP growth and ILR as predictor variables for next
quarter GDP growth. We also compare the models with the other nancial variables to
the restricted autoregressive model for GDP growth.
We evaluate forecast performance using two test statistics. The rst test is an encom-
passing test (ENC-NEW) proposed by Clark and McCracken (2001). The ENC-NEW
test asks whether the restricted model (the model that do not include ILR), encompasses
the unrestricted model that includes ILR. If the restricted model does not encompass the
unrestricted model, that means that the additional predictor (ILR) in the larger, unre-
stricted, model improves forecast accuracy relative to the baseline. Clark and McCracken
(2001) shows that the ENC-NEW test has greater power than tests for equality of MSE.
The ENC-NEW test statistic is given as









where P is the number of out-of-sample forecasts, "r;t+1 denotes the rolling out-of-sample
errors from the restricted (baseline) model that excludes ILR, "u;t+1 is the rolling out-of-
sample forecast errors from the unrestricted model that includes ILR, and MSEu denotes
the mean squared error of the unrestricted model that includes ILR.
The second test statistic we examine is an F-type test for equal MSE between two
16nested models proposed by McCracken (2007) termed MSE-F. This test is given by




where MSEr is the mean squared forecast error from the restricted model that excludes
ILR, and MSRu is the mean squared forecast error of the unrestricted model that in-
cludes ILR. Both the ENC-NEW and MSE-F statistics are nonstandard and we use the
bootstrapped critical values provided by Clark and McCracken (2001).15
Panel B of table 6 provides the results for nested model comparisons of one-quarter
ahead and two-quarter-ahead out-of-sample forecasts of GDP growth for the full sample
period 1947-2008. The rst column shows which variables are included in the unrestricted
model, and the second column shows which variable constitute the restricted (baseline)
model. In column three to ve we report the relative mean squared error between the
unrestricted (MSEu) and restricted model (MSEr), the MSE-F test statistic and the
ENC-NEW statistic for the one-quarter-ahead forecasts, and in the last three columns
we report the same test statistics for the two-quarters-ahead forecasts.
Looking rst at the one-quarter-ahead forecasts we see that the relative MSE is less
than one for all model comparisons except in the case when the baseline model is the
credit spread (CRED). The MSE-F test for equal MSE between the unrestricted and
restricted model reject the null of equal MSE, in favor of the MSEu being lower than
MSEr for all models except in the case when credit spread (Cred) constitutes the baseline
model. Based on the ENC-NEW test we reject the null that the unrestricted models are
encompassed by the restricted model at the 1% signicance level for all cases. These
results provide strong support that ILR improves forecast accuracy relative to all of the
baseline models. For the two-quarters-ahead forecasts, we get similar results, although
based on the MSE-F test we cannot reject the null and claim that the MSE of a model
with ILR and Rm is better than a model with only Rm. The ENC-NEW test, however,
supports the claim that ILR contains additional information to Rm.
One more observation from Panel B is worth noting. The model that adds the term
spread does not improve the MSE relative to the restricted autoregressive model in the
one-quarter-ahead forecast comparison. However, when we compare the one-quarter-
ahead and two-quarter-ahead performance of the unrestricted models, the term spread
specication has the greatest improvement in MSE. This is consistent with results in the
literature that suggest that the forecast ability of the term spread is better for longer
horizons.
15The bootstrapped critical values are available at
http://www.kansascityfed.org\Econres\addfiles\criticalvalues_tec.xls
17In Panel C of table 6 we change the baseline model to an autoregressive model for
GDP growth, and test whether adding ILR (or any of the other nancial variables)
improves forecast accuracy of GDP growth relative to an autoregressive model for GDP
growth. Looking rst at the one-quarter-ahead forecasts, we nd that ILR, Rm and Cred
signicantly improves the MSE relative to the baseline model. Adding the term spread or
volatility to the model does not signicantly reduce the MSE. The more powerful ENC-
NEW test rejects the null that the baseline model encompass the unrestricted model at
the 1% level for all variables except for market volatility where the null is rejected at the
5% level.
For the two-quarters-ahead forecasts all variables except market volatility improve the
forecast accuracy of the autoregressive baseline model. Note also that the unrestricted
model that includes ILR shows the greatest improvement in MSE over the baseline model
when giving two-quarters-ahead forecasts.
3 Firm size and the information content of liquidity
Small rms are relatively more sensitive to economic downturns than large rms. There-
fore rm size might be of particular interest for the purpose of this paper. If the business
cycle component in liquidity is caused by investors moving out of assets that has a ten-
dency to perform particularly bad in recessions, we would expect that the liquidity of
small rms should re
ect this eect most strongly. Thus, we would expect the liquidity
variation of small rms to be higher than the liquidity variation of large rms, and also
the liquidity of small rms to be more informative about future macro fundamentals. To
examine this more closely we run in-sample predictive regressions with liquidity variables
based on dierent rm size quartiles. Firms are assigned into size quartiles at the begin-
ning of the year based on their market capitalization the last trading day of the previous
year. We use two liquidity variables, one based on the liquidity of the 25% smallest rms
and one based on the liquidity of the 25% largest rms.
Table 7 reports the results from regression models where we include the dierent
control variables used earlier. In the models where we try to predict next quarters GDP
growth, the liquidity of small rms has a signicant coecient (^ 
LIQ
S ) for all three liquidity
proxies. The liquidity of large rms has an insignicant coecient (^ 
LIQ
L ) for all liquidity
proxies in all models, a result which is also conrmed in table 8, which shows the results
from Granger causality tests between the liquidity proxies for small and large rms and
GDP growth. In the second and third column we report the 2 statistic and associated
p-value from the test of the null that GDP growth does not Granger cause the respective
liquidity variable. We cannot reject the null for any of the models. In the two last
18columns we test the null that the liquidity variable does not Granger cause GDP growth.
For all liquidity measures sampled for the small rms we reject the null at the 5% level
or better.
Overall the results in tables 7 and 8 suggest that the illiquidity of smaller rms is
most informative about future economic conditions. We view this result as consistent
with our conjecture that variation in market liquidity is caused by portfolio shifts due to
changing expectations about economic fundamentals.
Finally, if investors have a tendency to move out of small rms and this causes activity
to drop and liquidity to worsen, we would expect this to show up in the trading activity
of these rms. We have actually in unreported analysis investigated measures of trading
volume and found it to be less informative than other liquidity measures about real
variables, but looking at volume may still help in our understanding of the mechanisms.
In gure 3 we therefore examine whether the change in turnover (measured as the shares
traded divided by the number of outstanding shares) is dierent for small and large rms.
As before, the bars show the cumulative average quarterly growth in real GDP and the
solid line the cumulative average change in ILR. The dashed line shows the cumulative
average change in turnover for small rms, and the dotted line shows the same series
for large rms. The result in the gure indicate a striking systematic dierence between
the trading activity in small and large rms before recessions. While the turnover for
large rms are essentially unchanged before the rst recession quarter, the turnover for
small rms is falling steadily already from four quarters before the rst recession quarter.
Furthermore, both the turnover for small and large rms starts increasing already in the
middle of the NBER recessions. Since this pattern is strongest for small rms, it suggests
that investors increase their demand for equities in general, and for smaller rms in
particular, when they start expecting the future economic conditions to improve.
4 Systematic liquidity variations and portfolio shifts
- Evidence from Norway
We conjecture that the systematic liquidity variations found are linked to portfolio shifts
and changes in market participation during economic downturns, i.e. that traders desire
to move away from equity investments in general (\
ight to quality") and from small
illiquid stocks in particular (\
ight to liquidity"). Using special data on stock ownership
from the Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE), we can actually examine this conjecture. Moreover,
the Norwegian data set provides a valuable robustness check of our results from the US
market.
194.1 The Norwegian evidence of predictability
We have to rst check that we get similar results on predictability as in the US case,
and start by assessing the in-sample predictive ability of market liquidity for the macro
variables real GDP growth (dGDPR), growth in the unemployment rate (dUE), real
consumption growth (dCONSR) and growth in investments (dINV). We use the Amihud
illiquidity ratio (ILR) and relative spread (RS) as our liquidity proxies. Both the ILR
and RS pass stationarity tests, so we do not dierence the liquidity series.
In table 9 we show the results from the in-sample predictive regressions. We look at
two model specications. In the rst specication we use only market liquidity and the
lagged dependent variable as predictors for next quarter growth in the respective macro
variables. We see that regardless of choice of liquidity proxy, the coecient on market
liquidity is highly signicant across all models and have the expected signs. A worsening
of market liquidity (increase in RS or ILR) predicts a decrease in next quarter GDP,
consumption, investment and an increase in the unemployment rate.16
In the second model specication we control for other variables. In the US analysis,
we used four nancial control variables; the term spread, credit spread, market returns
and market volatility. In Norway, no credit spread series are available for the length
of our sample period. This is mainly due to a historically very thin credit market in
Norway. Thus, we are only able to control for the other three variables. The results from
regressions based on this specication is reported in columns 5-7 in table 9. The coecient
on market liquidity () is highly signicant for all models except for consumption growth.
None of the other nancial variables have signicant coecients, however it should be
noted that if we exclude the relative spread, the term spread enters signicantly into the
models for dGDPR and dUE (but the adjusted R-squared of the models are more than
halved). Thus, although Term is highly correlated with our liquidity proxies, there seem
to be a signicant amount of additional information in market liquidity.
We also performed an out-of-sample analysis for Norway. For the sake of brevity we
do not show the results, only summarize the main ndings. In nested model comparisons
between RS and the other nancial control variables (Term, Rm, Vola) the MSE-F test
suggest that the MSE of an unrestricted model (including liquidity as a predictor), has
a signicantly lower MSE across all models. The results are a bit weaker with respect to
the ENC-NEW test, where we are not able to reject the null that RS is encompassed by a
model with only Term or Rm. However, the ENC-NEW test suggests that Vola does not
encompass RS. We also compare the out-of-sample forecast performance of liquidity to
16We have also examined models with dierent lags of the explanatory variables as well as dierent
lags of the dependent variable. The size and signicance of the coecient on RS and ILR is largely
unaected by these variations in model specication.
20an autoregressive model for GDP growth. Adding either RS or ILR to the autoregressive
GDP model signicantly improves the MSE. In addition, the null that the restricted GDP
model encompass an unrestricted model that either adds RS or ILR is strongly rejected.
We also checked the Granger causality between our two proxies for market liquidity and
the dierent macro variables. We cannot reject the null that GDP growth does not
Granger cause RS, while we reject the reverse hypothesis at the 1% level. This result is
similar when we use the ILR as our liquidity proxy. The results are similar for most of
the other macro variables and illiquidity measures.
In summary, both the in-sample and out of sample results for Norway are very similar
to the results for the US, suggesting that the result that market liquidity is related to
future macro is robust to change of market, market structure and trading system.
4.2 The importance of rm size
To examine whether the informativeness of the liquidity about future GDP growth diers
between small and large rms, we sort rms on the OSE into four groups based on their
market capitalization at the end of the previous year, and calculate the average liquidity
for each size group. We use the liquidity series for the smallest and largest group as
explanatory variables. For brevity we only report results of Granger causality tests,
shown in table 10. The results are similar to what we found for the US in table 8. We
reject the null hypothesis that both RS S and ILR S sampled for the small rms does not
Granger cause dGDPR, while we are unable to reject the null when using the liquidity
measured for the largest rms.
4.3 Portfolio shifts and liquidity
A possible channel through which the documented relationship between stock market
liquidity and business cycles may work is changes in portfolio compositions. In this
section we therefore investigate whether investors do in fact tilt their portfolios towards
more liquid assets in economic downturns. Our Norwegian data set includes monthly
ownership of all investors in all Norwegian companies listed at the OSE over the period
1991-2007. The challenge lies in constructing aggregate measures of changes in portfolio
composition. We do this in two dierent ways. First we focus on market participation and
look at the full portfolio of each investor. Then we look at concentration and movements
between owner types for individual stocks, without controlling for the portfolios across
stocks.
21Market participation on an investor-by-investor basis
Our ownership data lets us construct the actual portfolios of all investors, and how they
change over time. We want a variable that can be informative about both the degree
to which investors move in and out of the stock market, and the degree to which the
structure of their stock portfolios change. The measure should mainly be in
uenced by
actual changes in stock ownership. This rules out measures based on wealth changes,
since such measures have the undesirable characteristic that wealth can change due to
stock price changes, even if investors do not make any active portfolio changes. We
therefore use the number of shares owned by an investor as the basic piece of data.
We can not sum the number of shares across stocks, since this is again sensitive to price
dierences across shares. Instead, we simply ask: When do an owner realize the portfolio?
Obviously when he sell all his stocks. Our measure of aggregate changes uses these cases
to identify aggregate movements in and out of the market, or a group of stocks, such as
a size portfolio.
Our time series is constructed by comparing the set of participants at two following
dates. The set of investors which were present at the rst date, but not on the second
date is the set of investors leaving the market. Similarly, we count the number of investors
present at the second date, but not at the rst. This is the number of investors entering
the market. The net change in investors is the number of investors entering the market
less the number of investors leaving the market. This number is used as a measure of the
change in portfolio composition. The net change in investors is calculated for all owners
as well as for each of the owner types (personal, foreign, nancial, nonnancial(corporate)
and state owners).17 Panel A of Table 11 shows some descriptive statistics for the net
change in portfolio compositions at the annual level. On average about 15 thousand
investors leave the market between one year and the next, which is about a quarter of
the investors present at the beginning of the year. The net change is positive, which
says that on average the number of investors on the exchange has been increasing over
the period. Panel A also shows the average number of investors leaving and entering the
market within each owner type. Note that in the calculations for dierent owner types
we only consider owners of the given type, i.e. the fraction of investors is conditioned on
the type. For example, the average of 51 nancial owners leaving corresponds to about
14% of nancial investors, only. As is clear from the table the most common investor
type is personal investors.18
17In implementing the calculation we attempt to reduce noise by removing trivial holdings of less than
a hundred shares, since this is the minimum lot size at the Oslo Stock Exchange.
18There is an institutional reason for the decrease in foreign investors. It is a re
ection of the increased
ownership through nominee accounts, where foreign owners register through a nominee account. The
Norwegian Central Securities Registry do not have details on nominee ownership, they only have data
22As we saw for both the US and Norway, the time series of small rms' liquidity
have more predictive content than the time series of large rms' liquidity. We therefore
construct measures of changes in participation for dierent size quartiles, i.e. we sort the
stocks at the OSE based on size, and each year construct four size based stock portfolios.
We then calculate the same participation measure, the net number of new owners, but
now only for the stocks in each portfolio. So, if an investor had holdings in small stocks,
only, but moved them to large stocks, we would count this as leaving the small stock
portfolio and entering the large stock portfolio.
Panel B of Table 11 shows the correlations between liquidity, measured by the relative
bid ask spread, and portfolio changes for various owner types. If liquidity worsen (spreads
increase) when the number of participants in the market falls, we should expect a negative
correlation between spreads and changes in the number of investors. This relationship
should be strongest for the least liquid stocks. That is exactly what we nd. For the
portfolio of the smallest stocks on the OSE there is a signicantly negative correlation
between relative spreads and changes in participation. The correlation becomes smaller
in magnitude when we move to portfolios of larger rms, the correlation being smallest
in magnitude for the portfolio of largest rms.
Movements between owner types for individual stocks
A problem with the measure of participation above may be that it only considers cases
of complete withdrawal from the market. We therefore also calculate a measure for in-
dividual stocks. If participation falls (i.e. the net change is negative), either completely
or partially, this will result in increased ownership concentration among the remaining
investors in a stock. There may also be portfolio shifts between owner types. These
measures are much simpler to calculate, as they can be found on a stock-by-stock basis.
In panels C and D in table 11 we show the results of looking at correlations between
changes in liquidity and respectively ownership concentration and owner type. The in-
teresting numbers are the dierences between the portfolio of small rms (quartile 1) and
large rms. We see that when for example the spread is increasing, the concentration is
increasing for the portfolio of small stocks (positive correlation), but is decreasing for the
portfolio of large stocks. Similarly, when the spread increases the number of owners is
decreasing for the portfolio of small stocks, but increasing for the large stocks. There is
also some interesting patterns with respect to owner type. When the spread is increas-
ing nancials tend to decrease their stake in small stocks but increase the stake in large
on the total held in nominee accounts. The number of foreign investors we are using is the number of
directly registered foreign owners, which has decreased, although the fraction of OSE held by foreigners
has increased throughout the period.
23stocks.
To sum up, using two dierent measures of changes in portfolio compositions, we nd
evidence consistent with our hypothesis that liquidity changes are related to portfolio
shifts.
5 Conclusion
In the current nancial crisis there has been a great deal of attention on the fact that
a collapse in liquidity was a precursor to the recession in the real economy. We show
that this is just the extreme case of a general relationship { that stock market liquidity
contains information about current and future macroeconomic conditions.
The prime contribution of this paper is to provide two empirical observations. First,
we show that the liquidity in the stock market contains useful information for estimating
the current and future state of the economy. These results are shown to be remarkably
robust to our choice of liquidity proxy and sample period. The relationship is also very
similar for two dierent markets, the US and Norway. Second, we nd evidence that
time variation in equity market liquidity is related to changes in the participation in the
stock market, especially for the smallest rms. Participation in small rms decreases
when the economy (and market liquidity) worsen. This is consistent with a \
ight to
quality" eect and with the nding that the liquidity of the smallest rms contain the
most information about future economic conditions. In addition to suggesting a new
nancial market based predictor, our results provide a new explanation for the observed
commonality in liquidity.
There are a number of interesting ways to follow up our results. First, our results
showing that (Granger) causality goes from the stock market to the real economy has
interesting implications for prediction, particularly in a policy context. The ability to
improve forecasts and \nowcasts" (Giannone, Reichlin, and Small, 2008) of such central
macroeconomic variables as unemployment, GDP, consumption and the like will be par-
ticularly interesting for central banks and other economic planners. Second, while we
have found evidence of the link from observed liquidity to the economy using data for the
US and Norway, it would be interesting to also look at other stock markets. Finally, our
nding that stock market participation is related to liquidity time variation should be
important input to asset pricing theorists attempting to understand why liquidity seems
to be priced in the cross-section of stock returns.
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26Figure 1 Liquidity and the business cycle
The gure shows time series plots of annual ILR for the US over the period 1947-2008. The gray bars are the NBER








1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
NBER recessions ILR detrendedFigure 2 Market illiquidity around NBER recessions
In panel A the gure shows the accumulated growth in ILR (solid line) and accumulated GDP growth (bars) averaged
in event time across dierent NBER recession periods. All NBER recession periods are aligned to start at NBER1. The
gure shows the results when looking at all 10 NBER recessions during the full sample period 1947-2008. In Panel B we
show similar gures, adding similar evolutions of the cumulative average changes in (a) term spread, (b) credit spread, (c)
excess market return and (d) volatility.
Panel A: Liquidity evolution approaching recessions.
Panel B: Comparing to other nancial variables.
(a) Term spread (b) Credit spread
(c) Market return (d) VolatilityFigure 3 Market illiquidity and trading activity (turnover) around NBER recessions
The gure shows the accumulated average growth in ILR (solid line) and accumulated average GDP growth (bars) averaged
in event time before, during and after NBER recession periods. In addition, the dashed line shows the accumulated average
change in turnover for the 25% smallest rms and the dotted line shows the accumulated average change in turnover for
the 25% largest rms. Turnover is measured as the shares traded divided by the number of outstanding shares. All the
NBER recession periods are aligned to start at NBER1.Table 1 Describing liquidity measures
Panels A and B show descriptive statistics for the US liquidity measures. The US sample covers the period from 1947
through 2008. The liquidity measures examined are the relative bid-ask spread (RS), the Lesmond et al. (1999) measure
(LOT), the Amihud (2002) illiquidity ratio (ILR) and the Roll (1984) implicit spread estimator (Roll). Note that the
Relative spread is not universally available, the CRSP data only include full data on spreads starting in 1980, but there
are some observations earlier. The liquidity measures are calculated for each available stock once each quarter. Panel A
shows the mean and median of the liquidity measures, the number of securities used, the total number of observations
(each security is observed in several quarters), and estimates of average liquidity measures for dierent subperiods. Panel
B shows correlation coecients between the liquidity measures. The correlations are calculated across all stocks and time,
i.e. the liquidity measures are calculated for each available stock once each quarter, and the correlations are pairwise
correlations between these liquidity measures. Panels C and D show corresponding statistics for the Norwegian liquidity
measures. The Norwegian sample covers the period from 1980 through 2008.
Panel A: Descriptive statistics, US liquidity measures
Liquidity Means subperiods
measure mean median no secs no obs 1947-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-08
RS 0.021 0.014 4248 146262 0.021 0.019 0.020 0.027 0.016
LOT 0.035 0.022 5177 340076 0.027 0.031 0.051 0.037 0.040 0.027
ILR 0.657 0.056 5178 340668 1.900 0.818 0.829 0.294 0.366 0.176
Roll 0.017 0.013 5141 174326 0.012 0.013 0.015 0.015 0.017 0.018




ILR 0.41 0.38 0.32
Panel C: Descriptive statistics, Norwegian liquidity measures
Means subperiods
Liquidity 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2008
measure mean median no secs no obs
RS 0.042 0.029 788 14942 0.041 0.046 0.040
LOT 0.054 0.039 753 14852 0.055 0.064 0.049
ILR 0.772 0.205 770 15092 1.149 0.875 0.452
Roll 0.027 0.021 663 7209 0.027 0.026 0.026




ILR 0.40 0.34 0.49Table 2 Correlations
The table shows the Pearson correlation coecients between the variables used in the analysis for the US. The associated
p-values are reported in parenthesis below each correlation coecient. Correlations in bold are signicant at the 5% level or
lower. dILR, dLOT and Roll are the three liquidity measures, Term is our proxy for the term spread and Cred is the credit
spread. With respect to additional equity market variables, we examine market volatility (Vola) which is calculated as the
cross sectional average volatility of all stocks in the CRSP database, and excess market return (Rm) which is the return
on the S&P500 index in excess of the risk free rate (proxied by the 3 month t-bill rate). With respect to macroeconomic
variables, dGDPR is the real GDP growth, dINV is the growth in investments, dUE is the change in the unemployment
rate and dCONSR is the real consumption growth.
Market variables Macro variables
ILR LOT Roll Term Cred Vola Rm dGDPR dINV dCONSR
Term -0.17 -0.14 -0.04
(0.00) (0.04) (0.55)
Cred 0.32 0.34 0.42 -0.21
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Vola 0.30 0.57 0.47 -0.15 0.42
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
Rm -0.53 -0.19 -0.35 0.33 -0.17 -0.33
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
dGDPR -0.16 -0.10 -0.31 0.16 -0.27 0.01 0.09
(0.02) (0.15) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.87) (0.19)
dINV -0.16 -0.17 -0.40 0.18 -0.26 -0.07 0.09 0.73
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.27) (0.21) (0.00)
dCONSR -0.27 -0.15 -0.38 0.21 -0.34 -0.08 0.16 0.68 0.57
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.24) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
dUE 0.16 0.15 0.33 -0.10 0.28 0.08 -0.04 -0.65 -0.62 -0.56
(0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.14) (0.00) (0.21) (0.58) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)Table 3 Descriptive statistics for the ownership data
The table shows some summary statistics for the ownership data. For each stock we calculate the fraction of the stock held
by its largest owner (Largest owner) and three largest owners (Three largest), the total number of owners, and the fraction
of the rm held by the ve dierent mutually exclusive owner types: State, foreign, nancial, nonnancial and individual
owners.
1989{2007 1989{1994 1995{1999 2000{2007
average med average med average med average med
vw ew vw ew vw ew vw ew
Largest owner 37.2 27.6 21.0 28.4 26.2 20.8 29.4 27.0 21.0 44.8 28.3 21.1
Three largest 50.9 44.1 41.9 45.1 43.4 38.5 44.8 43.4 41.8 56.6 44.7 43.1
Total no owners 13956 2327 860 7861 1853 654 7511 1847 814 19884 2775 965
Fraction State Owners 26.9 6.2 0.5 21.2 6.5 1.0 19.6 6.3 0.4 33.3 6.0 0.4
Fraction Foreign Owners 31.7 22.8 12.7 29.3 20.5 13.3 33.4 22.5 13.7 31.2 23.6 11.2
Fraction Financial Owners 16.8 18.7 16.6 18.5 20.6 18.1 20.5 21.0 19.4 13.9 16.7 14.3
Fraction Nonnancial Owners 19.1 35.0 28.9 25.6 41.0 40.8 20.9 33.6 28.8 16.0 34.1 27.6
Fraction Individual Owners 7.5 19.7 13.3 10.9 18.3 12.4 8.8 20.0 13.0 5.7 19.9 13.7Table 4 In-sample prediction of macro variables
The table shows the results from predictive regressions where we regress next quarters growth in dierent macro variables
on three proxies for market illiquidity for the period 1947-2008. Market illiquidity (LIQj) is proxied by one of three
illiquidity measures: the Amihud Illiquidity ratio (ILR), the LOT measure and the Roll measure (Roll). We use the
log dierence in ILR and LOT to preserve stationarity, while the Roll measure is not dierenced. The model estimated
is yt+1 =  + LIQt + 
0Xt + ut+1 where yt+1 is one of real GDP growth (dGDPR), growth in the unemployment
rate (dUE), real consumption growth (dCONSR) or growth in private investments (dINV). We also include one lag of
the dependent variable (yt). The Newey-West corrected t-statistics (with 4 lags) is reported in parentheses below the
coecient estimates, and  R2 is the adjusted R2. The sample period is from 1947-2008.
Panel A: ILR liquidity measure
Dependent






dGDPR 0.006 -0.013 0.224 0.13
(7.58) (-5.37) (3.68)
dUE 0.003 0.074 0.300 0.13
(0.61) (3.68) (5.14)
dCONSR 0.006 -0.006 0.305 0.11
(7.07) (-3.33) (4.46)
dINV 0.006 -0.034 0.265 0.15
(2.95) (-6.18) (3.97)
dGDPR 0.005 -0.011 0.214 0.001 -0.005 0.16
(5.02) (-4.60) (3.67) (1.17) (-2.29)
dUE 0.015 0.057 0.303 -0.009 0.042 0.18
(1.95) (3.02) (5.23) (-2.83) (3.19)
dCONSR 0.004 -0.005 0.305 0.001 -0.001 0.13
(3.86) (-2.88) (4.48) (2.32) (-0.66)
dINV 0.001 -0.027 0.247 0.004 -0.018 0.23
(0.45) (-5.23) (3.98) (2.58) (-3.84)
dGDPR 0.006 -0.008 0.203 0.000 -0.005 0.000 0.016 0.16
(5.72) (-3.90) (3.57) (0.92) (-2.38) (-0.02) (2.01)
dUE 0.006 0.021 0.307 -0.008 0.048 -0.033 -0.235 0.21
(0.79) (1.14) (6.25) (-2.64) (3.56) (-0.93) (-4.58)
dCONSR 0.005 -0.001 0.302 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.026 0.17
(4.76) (-0.39) (4.43) (2.29) (-1.04) (0.34) (3.38)
dINV 0.003 -0.020 0.243 0.004 -0.019 0.007 0.048 0.24
(1.16) (-3.74) (3.91) (2.54) (-3.95) (0.55) (2.14)
Panel B: LOT liquidity measure
Dependent






dGDPR 0.007 -0.017 0.168 0.06
(7.52) (-2.77) (2.58)
dUE 0.003 0.129 0.261 0.10
(0.47) (3.14) (4.42)
dCONSR 0.006 -0.009 0.282 0.09
(7.03) (-1.74) (3.85)
dINV 0.007 -0.039 0.218 0.07
(3.03) (-2.56) (3.20)
dGDPR 0.006 -0.012 0.135 0.001 -0.006 0.10
(5.06) (-2.13) (2.18) (1.35) (-2.86)
dUE 0.015 0.089 0.252 -0.010 0.045 0.16
(1.86) (2.46) (4.67) (-3.02) (3.56)
dCONSR 0.004 -0.006 0.263 0.001 -0.001 0.12
(3.98) (-1.35) (3.38) (2.44) (-0.89)
dINV 0.002 -0.021 0.165 0.004 -0.021 0.17
(0.57) (-1.58) (2.89) (2.85) (-4.65)
dGDPR 0.007 -0.012 0.162 0.000 -0.006 0.005 0.029 0.14
(6.16) (-2.07) (2.80) (0.81) (-2.92) (0.90) (3.74)
dUE 0.005 0.107 0.290 -0.007 0.048 -0.084 -0.269 0.23
(0.67) (2.63) (6.02) (-2.54) (3.65) (-2.02) (-5.48)
dCONS 0.005 -0.006 0.291 0.001 -0.001 0.005 0.027 0.18
(5.02) (-1.17) (4.30) (2.26) (-1.02) (0.84) (4.41)
dINV 0.005 -0.023 0.216 0.003 -0.021 0.017 0.079 0.22
(1.61) (-1.70) (3.42) (2.53) (-4.57) (1.15) (4.00)Table 4 (Continued)
Panel C: Roll liquidity measure
Dependent






dGDPR 0.019 -0.813 0.133 0.10
(5.96) (-4.12) (2.10)
dUE -0.074 5.206 0.236 0.12
(-3.07) (3.28) (4.23)
dCONSR 0.013 -0.437 0.264 0.11
(4.22) (-2.28) (3.37)
dINV 0.040 -2.228 0.169 0.12
(4.29) (-3.61) (2.65)
dGDPR 0.017 -0.744 0.167 0.001 -0.005 0.14
(5.29) (-3.95) (2.66) (2.20) (-2.20)
dUE -0.051 4.732 0.273 -0.012 0.037 0.18
(-2.28) (3.32) (4.67) (-3.90) (2.97)
dCONSR 0.011 -0.482 0.286 0.002 0.000 0.15
(3.97) (-2.61) (3.99) (3.18) (-0.24)
dINV 0.031 -2.047 0.209 0.005 -0.016 0.23
(3.86) (-3.85) (3.35) (3.69) (-3.95)
dGDPR 0.016 -0.614 0.138 0.001 -0.005 0.005 0.022 0.16
(4.68) (-3.03) (2.38) (1.58) (-2.46) (0.88) (2.83)
dUE -0.043 3.492 0.275 -0.010 0.044 -0.063 -0.226 0.23
(-1.75) (2.26) (5.98) (-3.31) (3.41) (-1.61) (-4.77)
dCONSR 0.010 -0.331 0.278 0.001 -0.001 0.005 0.023 0.18
(3.64) (-1.82) (3.92) (2.89) (-0.70) (0.96) (3.66)
dINV 0.030 -1.833 0.171 0.005 -0.019 0.024 0.058 0.25
(3.72) (-3.35) (2.94) (3.26) (-4.20) (1.83) (2.94)Table 5 Granger causality tests
The table shows Granger causality tests between the quarterly real GDP growth (dGDPR) and the (a) Amihud Illiquidity
ratio (ILR), (b) the LOT measure and (c) the Roll measure. The test is performed for the whole sample, and dierent
sub-periods. For each measure we rst test the null hypothesis that real GDP growth do not Granger cause market
illiquidity and the whether market illiquidity do not Granger cause real GDP growth. We report the 2 and p-value
(in parenthesis) for each test. We choose the optimal lag length for each test based on the Schwartz criterion. For each
illiquidity variable the test is performed on the whole sample period (1947q1-2008q4), the rst (1947q1-1977q4) and second
half (1978q1-2008q4) of the sample, and for rolling 20 year subperiods overlapping by 10 years. The rst two rows report
the number of quarterly observations covered by each sample period and the number of NBER recession periods within
each sample.
Whole First Second
sample half half 20 year sub-periods
1947 1947- 1978- 1950- 1960- 1970- 1980- 1990-
2008 1977 2008 1970 1980 1990 2000 2008
N (observations) 243 119 124 84 84 84 84 76
NBER recessions 11 6 5 5 4 4 2 3
(a) ILR measure
H0: dGDPR9 dILR
2 4.08 1.66 3.13 3.84 3.56 3.35 2.83 2.66
p-value (0.13) (0.44) (0.21) (0.15) (0.17) (0.19) (0.24) (0.26)
H0: dILR9 dGDPR
2 31.97 19.01 14.50 16.42 8.89 11.70 11.64 11.85
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
(b) LOT measure
H0: dGDPR9 dLOT
2 2.21 1.77 1.13 2.20 1.48 1.21 0.06 1.05
p-value (0.14) (0.18) (0.29) (0.14) (0.22) (0.27) (0.80) (0.31)
H0: dLOT9 dGDPR
2 9.55 13.37 1.45 8.24 7.70 6.81 1.22 0.99
p-value (0.00) (0.00) (0.23) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.27) (0.32)
(c) ROLL measure
H0: dGDPR9 Roll
2 0.09 0.31 0.75 0.27 0.01 2.30 1.33 0.01
p-value (0.77) (0.58) (0.39) (0.60) (0.91) (0.13) (0.25) (0.91)
H0: Roll9 dGDPR
2 15.96 5.56 10.80 2.95 10.74 9.31 4.43 10.18
p-value (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.09) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00)Table 6 Results of out of sample tests
The table in panel A reports the results of one-quarter ahead, non-nested, forecast comparisons between models with
dierent liquidity proxies. The variable being forecast is the quarterly GDP growth. Each pair of numbers compare two
alternative univariate forecast models (which includes a constant term). The table compares the out-of-sample MSE of
a model that uses one of the liquidity variables labeled under Model 1 as a predictor, with a model that uses one of the
variables labeled in the rst column under Model 2. For each model pair, the table shows the relative MSE between model
1 and model 2, and the modied Diebold/Mariano test statistic (labeled MDM). The null hypothesis for the MDM test is
that the MSE of Model 2 and Model 1 are equal against the alternative that the MSE for model 1 is less than that of model
2. A MDM test statistic with  reject the null of equal forecast ability at the 5% level. The last row in the table shows
the MSE (multiplied by 103) for each model. Panel B report the results from nested model comparisons for predicting
quarterly real GDP growth out of sample one-quarter and two-quarter ahead. The rst column shows the variables in the
unrestricted model, and the second column shows the variable included in the restricted (baseline) model. Columns 3 to 5
shows the relative MSE, the MSE-F test for equality of MSE and the ENC-NEW test for the one-quarter-ahead forecast.
Columns 6 to 8 shows the test statistics for the two-quarter-ahead forecasts. Panel C shows the results from when the
baseline model is an autoregressive model (of order 1) for GDP growth. In that case the unrestricted models adds ILR and
each of the other nancial variables to the restricted model.
Panel A: Choosing liquidity variable: Predicting GDP growth with dierent liquidity
proxies
Model 1
Model 2 Statistic ILR LOT Roll
LOT MSE1/MSE2 0.89 -
MDM 1.74 -
Roll MSE1/MSE2 0.82 0.91 -
MDM 1.89 0.47 -
MSE (x103) 0.088 0.099 0.108
Panel B: Forecasting real GDP growth: Illiquidity (ILR) versus other nancial variables
1 quarter-ahead forecasts 2 quarters-ahead forecasts
Unrestricted Restricted
model model MSEu
MSEr MSE-F ENC-NEW MSEu
MSEr MSE-F ENC-NEW
ILR, TERM TERM 0.917 20.95 41.96 0.927 18.09 31.49
ILR, Rm Rm 0.976 5.69 14.39 1.003 -0.59 12.33
ILR, CRED CRED 1.000 0.02 18.73 0.964 8.53 22.86
ILR, Vola Vola 0.889 28.76 50.91 0.895 26.88 35.98
Panel C: Forecasting real GDP growth: Financial variables versus an autoregressive model
1 quarter-ahead forecasts 2 quarters-ahead forecasts
Unrestricted Restricted
model model MSEu
MSEr MSE-F ENC-NEW MSEu
MSEr MSE-F ENC-NEW
ILR, dGDP dGDP 0.849 41.16 60.17 0.803 56.36 40.60
TERM, dGDP dGDP 0.988 2.91 34.75 0.866 35.44 28.99
Rm, dGDP dGDP 0.905 24.20 45.54 0.850 40.66 30.91
CRED, dGDP dGDP 0.838 44.63 51.37 0.850 40.54 28.77
Vola, dGDP dGDP 1.109 -22.77 9.92 1.049 -10.81 1.26Table 7 Predicting macro with market liquidity - size portfolios
The table shows the multivariate OLS estimates from regressing next quarters macro variables on current market illiquidity
of small and large rms and four control variables. We examine three dierent proxies for market illiquidity, sampled for




Xt + ut+1, where yt+1 is
real GDP growth, LIQsmall is the respective illiquidity proxy sampled for the 25% smallest rms and LIQlarge is the
illiquidity of the 25% largest rms, Xt contains the additional control variables (Term, Cred, Vola and Rm) and 
0 is the
vector with the respective coecient estimates for the control variables. The Newey-West corrected t-statistics (with 4
lags) is reported in parentheses below the coecient estimates, and  R2 is the adjusted R2.
Panel A: ILR liquidity measure









dGDPR 0.008 -0.008 0.003 0.000 -0.006 0.001 0.022 0.13
(7.40) (-3.66) (1.01) (0.74) (-2.48) (0.09) (2.35)
dUE 0.002 0.030 -0.042 -0.006 0.053 -0.029 -0.259 0.12
(0.26) (1.66) (0.09) (-1.78) (3.61) (-0.81) (-4.00)
dCONSR 0.008 -0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.028 0.08
(8.32) (-0.37) (0.54) (2.00) (-1.19) (0.10) (3.17)
dINV 0.006 -0.019 0.010 0.004 -0.022 0.015 0.065 0.18
(2.10) (-3.45) (1.09) (2.25) (-4.03) (1.13) (2.51)
Panel B: LOT liquidity measure









dGDPR 0.008 -0.014 0.000 0.000 -0.007 0.008 0.030 0.13
(7.34) (-2.15) (0.08) (0.62) (-3.04) (1.45) (3.67)
dUE 0.004 0.110 0.008 -0.006 0.052 -0.098 -0.246 0.14
(0.43) (3.52) (0.22) (-1.58) (3.69) (-2.46) (-4.72)
dCONSR 0.008 -0.005 -0.005 0.001 -0.002 0.005 0.026 0.09
(8.19) (-1.42) (-0.96) (1.93) (-1.04) (0.91) (3.95)
dINV 0.007 -0.017 -0.009 0.003 -0.024 0.027 0.078 0.17
(2.20) (-1.22) (-0.76) (2.15) (-4.50) (1.85) (3.79)
Panel C: Roll liquidity measure









dGDPR 0.017 -0.303 -0.272 0.001 -0.005 0.006 0.023 0.14
(5.11) (-2.37) (-0.98) (1.59) (-2.47) (1.12) (2.83)
dUE -0.050 2.402 0.859 -0.010 0.045 -0.073 -0.204 0.14
(-1.73) (2.70) (0.35) (-2.82) (3.22) (-1.75) (-3.92)
dCONSR 0.014 -0.300 -0.010 0.001 -0.001 0.005 0.023 0.11
(4.71) (-2.51) (-0.03) (3.02) (-0.53) (0.94) (3.42)
dINV 0.033 -1.063 -0.625 0.005 -0.020 0.034 0.059 0.22
(3.93) (-2.86) (-0.68) (3.26) (-4.10) (2.68) (2.84)Table 8 Granger causality - size portfolios
The table shows the results of Granger causality tests between real GDP growth and the illiquidity of small and large rms
for the three dierent illiquidity proxies. The rst column denote the liquidity variable, column two and three shows the 2
and associated p-value from Granger causality tests where the null hypothesis is that GDP growth does not Granger cause
the liquidity variables. Similarly, columns four and ve, show the results when the null hypothesis is that the liquidity
variable does not Granger cause GDP growth.
Liquidity dGDPR9 LIQ LIQ9 dGDPR
variable (LIQ) 2 p-value 2 p-value
ILRS 4.34 0.23 10.33 0.02
ILRL 6.86 0.08 1.32 0.72
RollS 0.67 0.72 6.44 0.04
RollL 0.19 0.91 5.60 0.06
LOTS 3.19 0.07 9.84 0.00
LOTL 0.20 0.65 0.03 0.87Table 9 In-sample predictive regressions - Norway
The table shows the results from predictive regressions for dierent macro variables. The regressions estimated are yt+1 =
 + LIQt + 
0Xt + ut+1, where LIQ is either RS or ILR, and the variables in X is the lagged dependent variable in
addition to Term, Vola and Rm.
Panel A: RS liquidity measure
Dependent





dGDPR 0.023 -0.397 -0.243 0.12
(5.28) (-4.03) (-4.03)
dUE -0.443 11.387 -0.150 0.12
(-3.94) (3.95) (-1.56)
dCONS 0.016 -0.216 -0.153 0.03
(3.75) (-2.43) (-1.62)
dINV 0.073 -1.686 -0.415 0.19
(3.79) (-4.01) (0.19)
dGDPR 0.019 -0.361 -0.259 0.001 0.240 0.001 0.11
(3.11) (-3.43) (-4.25) (1.64) (0.62) (0.08)
dUE -0.358 12.365 -0.166 -0.007 -14.022 -0.183 0.11
(-3.20) (3.05) (-1.39) (-0.57) (-1.00) (-0.77)
dCONS 0.018 -0.115 -0.127 0.000 -0.738 -0.010 0.03
(2.83) (-0.97) (-1.33) (0.22) (-1.88) (-1.20)
dINV 0.052 -1.325 -0.418 0.003 0.547 0.044 0.18
(1.56) (-2.66) (-5.03) (0.93) (0.24) (0.73)
Panel B: ILR liquidity measure
Dependent





dGDPR 0.012 -0.006 -0.225 0.11
(5.99) (-3.04) (-3.69)
dUE -0.108 0.141 -0.080 0.06
(-2.16) (2.49) (-0.82)
dCONS 0.011 -0.004 -0.142 0.04
(5.85) (-2.72) (-1.49)
dINV 0.021 -0.018 -0.404 0.16
(2.23) (-2.44) (-4.94)
dGDPR 0.010 -0.006 -0.231 0.001 0.165 0.007 0.10
(2.36) (-2.26) (-3.42) (0.85) (0.45) (0.67)
dUE -0.012 0.145 -0.085 -0.007 -10.323 -0.335 0.05
(-0.14) (2.22) (-0.78) (-0.45) (-1.01) (-1.39)
dCONS 0.016 -0.003 -0.128 0.000 -0.732 -0.007 0.04
(3.71) (-1.68) (-1.32) (-0.02) (-1.85) (-0.92)
dINV 0.011 -0.009 -0.404 0.004 -0.071 0.057 0.16
(0.50) (-0.80) (-4.96) (1.06) (-0.03) (0.88)Table 10 Granger causality Norway - size portfolios
The table shows the results of Granger causality tests between real GDP growth and the illiquidity of small and large rms
for the two dierent liquidity proxies for the Norwegian sample. The rst column denote the liquidity variable, column two
and three shows the 2 and associated p-value from Granger causality tests where the null hypothesis is that GDP growth
does not Granger cause the liquidity variables. Similarly, columns four and ve, show the results when the null hypothesis
is that the liquidity variable does not Granger cause GDP growth.
dGDPR9 LIQ LIQ9 dGDPR
Liquidity
variable (LIQ) 2 p-value 2 p-value
RSS 0.69 0.71 5.90 0.05
RSL 1.93 0.37 0.61 0.73
ILRS 0.15 0.67 4.92 0.03
ILRL 1.63 0.20 0.66 0.42Table 11 Changes in portfolio composition and liquidity
The table in panel A describes changes in ownership participation measured at an annual frequency. Each year in the
sample we calculate the number of investors leaving the market totally, entering the market, and the net change. We also
normalize the numbers by calculating what fraction of owners at the beginning of the period the numbers are. Panel B
present correlations between stock market liquidity measured by the average relative bid ask spread in a period and the
changes in stock market participation in the period. Change in stock market participation is the change in the number of
investors in the stock market, or the given portfolio, of the specied types. For annual data we use each year from 1990
to 2006, giving 16 observations. For the calculations with quarterly data we use data between 1993:1 to 2006:12, giving 56
quarterly observations.
Panel A: Describing annual changes in portfolio composition
Investor Number of investors Fraction of investors
type entering leaving net entering leaving net
All 15220 11934 3286 24.1 18.5 5.6
Personal owners 13445 10087 3358 24.3 17.5 6.8
Foreign owners 862 1119 -256 33.7 35.3 -1.6
Financial owners 51 44 6 14.8 12.4 2.4
Nonnancial owners 1013 838 175 24.4 19.6 4.8
State owners 14 11 3 20.8 15.1 5.7
Panel B: Correlation liquidity and change in stock market participation
Firm size quartiles
All Q1 Q4
rms (smallest rms) Q2 Q3 (largest rms)
All owners -0.07 (0.32) -0.35 (0.00) -0.10 (0.22) -0.20 (0.07) -0.11 (0.22)
Personal owners -0.02 (0.45) -0.33 (0.01) -0.09 (0.25) -0.18 (0.09) -0.08 (0.28)
Foreign owners -0.18 (0.09) -0.30 (0.01) -0.16 (0.12) -0.25 (0.03) -0.23 (0.04)
Financial owners -0.06 (0.33) -0.11 (0.21) 0.01 (0.46) -0.09 (0.25) -0.08 (0.27)
Nonnancial owners -0.16 (0.12) -0.35 (0.00) -0.11 (0.21) -0.21 (0.06) -0.20 (0.06)
State owners -0.06 (0.34) -0.20 (0.07) 0.19 (0.08) -0.10 (0.23) -0.06 (0.34)
Panel C: Correlation change in liquidity and change in ownership concentration
Firm Size Quartile
Concentration All Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
measure rms (smallest rms) (largest rms)
largest owner 0.07 (0.30) 0.13 (0.15) 0.13 (0.16) 0.09 (0.25) -0.06 (0.31)
Herndahl 0.09 (0.24) 0.20 (0.06) 0.10 (0.22) 0.18 (0.08) -0.12 (0.18)
No owners 0.37 (0.00) -0.09 (0.23) -0.22 (0.04) -0.27 (0.02) 0.37 (0.00)
Herndahl (ex 3 largest) 0.18 (0.08) 0.29 (0.01) 0.23 (0.04) -0.07 (0.29) -0.05 (0.36)
Panel D: Correlation change in liquidity and movement across owner types
Firm Size Quartile
Owner All Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
type rms (smallest rms) (largest rms)
Financial fraction -0.08 (0.26) -0.15 (0.12) -0.06 (0.34) -0.04 (0.38) 0.22 (0.04)
Individual fraction -0.12 (0.18) -0.14 (0.14) -0.10 (0.21) -0.06 (0.32) 0.24 (0.03)
Nonnancial fraction -0.06 (0.31) -0.13 (0.16) -0.01 (0.48) 0.04 (0.37) -0.18 (0.08)
Foreign fraction -0.05 (0.34) 0.10 (0.22) 0.06 (0.33) -0.16 (0.11) -0.17 (0.09)
State fraction 0.05 (0.34) -0.03 (0.42) -0.14 (0.13) 0.01 (0.48) 0.06 (0.32)